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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Constitutional Right to Jm-y Trial in Criminal 
Contempt Cases?-United States v. Barnett* 
Federal courts historically have had the power to try criminal 
contempt cases1 without a jury. There is a virtually uninterrupted 
150-year line of cases2 which holds that contempt is not a "Crime" 
or "criminal prosecution" within the meaning of article III and 
the sixth amendment to the Constitution.3 Superficially, the decision 
in United States v. Barnett is in accord with these precedents. How-
ever, in an important "dictum," footnote number 12, the majority 
cautioned that "punishment by summary trial without a jury would 
be constitutionally limited to that penalty provided for petty of-
fenses."4 Although the Court itself styles this comment a dictum, 
its potential effect is to overrule this long history of decisions. 
In the Barnett case, Mississippi Governor Barnett and Lieuten-
ant Governor Johnson were charged with violation of three federal 
court orders.5 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit divided 
• 376 U.S. 681 (1964). 
I. Criminal contempt cases are distinguishable from civil contempt cases. Al-
though both consist of acts disrespectful to the court, sanctions imposed for civil 
contempt are "remedial," Gompers v. Bucks Stove &: Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442-52 
(1911); Doyle v. London Guar. &: Acc. Co., 204 U.S. 599 (1907), either for the purpose 
of awarding compensatory damages, Mitchell v. All-States Business Prods. Corp., 232 
F. Supp. 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1964), or for inducing some required performance by the 
defendant, United States v. Testa, 334 F.2d 746 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 85 Sup. Ct. 83 
(1964). Criminal contempt sanctions are "punitive." Within the criminal contempt 
category the courts recognize a further distinction. Contumacious acts in the presence 
of the court are characterized as "direct," e.g., Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556 
(1961) (refusal to answer grand jury questions after being directed to do so by the 
court). Violations of court orders are labeled "indirect." The principal case is of this 
latter type. 
2. Fifty-four cases are collected in the principal case at 694-95, n.12. The most 
recent case is Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958), which received extensive 
comment, e.g., 72 HARv. L. REv. 153 (1958); 57 MICH. L. REv. 258 (1958). See note 
15 infra and accompanying text. 
3. "The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury .••• " 
U.S. CONST. art. III § 2. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed •••. " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
4. "In view of the impending contempt hearing, effective administration of 
justice requires that this dictum be added: Some members of the Court are of the 
view that, without regard to the seriousness of the offense, punishment by summary 
trial without a jury would be constitutionally limited to that penalty provided for 
petty offenses." Principal case at 695, n.12. The problems surrounding the definition 
of what constitutes punishment for petty offenses are set out in note 23 infra. 
5. Two orders were issued by the court of appeals and one by the District Court 
for the Southern District of Mississippi. The charges were filed with the court of 
appeals in accordance with FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (1958), 
which provide the substantive basis for federal indirect criminal contempt cases 
and the procedure to be followed therein. 
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evenly on the defendants' demand for a jury trial and certified the 
following question to the Supreme Court: Are two individuals 
charged with criminal contempt consisting of illegal disobedience 
of a court of appeals restraining order entitled, upon demand, to 
trial by jury?8 The United States Supreme Court answered in the 
negative, four Justices dissenting.7 
Defendants based their demand for a jury trial upon two 
grounds, one statutory and the other constitutional. All United 
States courts have statutory power to punish contempt consisting 
of disobedience to their lawful orders.8 Rule 42(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure allows such punishment to be im-
posed without a jury trial. However, an exception requiring jury 
trial is made in cases where the disobedience is to an order of a 
federal district court, issued in a case not brought by the United 
States, if such disobedience also constitutes a separate criminal 
offense.9 The defendants in Barnett, asserting the existence of these 
three elements, claimed a statutory right to jury trial. The majority 
rejected this contention upon a finding that the allegedly violated 
orders were issued by the court of appeals, and not the district 
court.10 Although this phase of the case was fully argued,11 and 
legislation does exert a significant overall influence on the law of 
criminal contempt,12 the possible importance_ of this approach is 
somewhat abated, in the federal courts at least, by the pre-emptive 
6. This is a paraphrased version. For the complete text of the question, see 
principal case at 682, n.2. 
7. The Chief Justice, Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg. 
8. 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (1958). But see Mr. Justice Black's dissent in the principal 
case at 724, in which he expresses doubt as to the statutory power of courts of 
appeal to try contempts. 
9. 18 u.s.c. §§ 402, 3691 (1958). 
10. Finding that this element was not established, the majority did not reach 
the other two. It appears to have been accepted that the defendants' behavior con-
stituted a separate criminal offense, but the majority expressly took no position on 
whether the case was brought by the United States. Principal case at 692, n.8. But 
see Mr. Justice Goldberg's dissent in the principal case at 728; by finding that 
the contempt proceeding was based on the district court order, that it was not 
brought by the United States, and that the violation constituted a separate criminal 
offense, under 18 U.S.C. § 1509 (Supp. V, 1964), he concluded that §§ 402 and 3691 
were applicable and that there did in fact exist a statutory right to jury trial. 
11. Brief for United States, pp. 20-44, principal case. 
12. Two other federal statutes provide for jury trial in certain criminal con-
tempt cases: 18 U.S.C. § 3692 (1958) (labor disputes); Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. XI, 
§ 1101, 78 Stat. 268. In addition, four states by statute guarantee a jury in all 
indirect criminal contempt trials: ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-863 (1956); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 24-105 (1959); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 567 {Supp. 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, 
§ 2047 (1962). Other states have variously limited this summary power: e.g., KY. REv. 
STAT. §§ 432.260(1), 432.290 (1962) (jury trial if punishment is to exceed $30 and 30 
hours imprisonment); N.Y. LAn. LAw § 808(1) and WIS. STAT. §§ 103.60(3), 133.07(4) 
(1957) (jury trial for contempt cases arising out of labor disputes); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 23-903 (1955) and WASH. REv. CODE § 7.20.020 (1956) (providing maximum limits 
for contempt punishments). 
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effect of footnote 12 and the probability that a clear constitutional • 
basis for the right to jury trial in indirect criminal contempt cases 
will soon be established. 
Defendants' second ground was based upon article III and the 
sixth amendment to the Constitution.13 In recent years the pre-
vailing view, denying a constitutional right to jury trial in all 
criminal contempt cases, has met increasing opposition within the 
Supreme Court.14 In a 1958 decision, Green v. United States,us a 
case factually similar to Barnett in that an indirect criminal con-
tempt charge for failure to obey a district court order was involved, 
four Justices also dissented. In both Green and Barnett the dissent-
ing views were comprehensively expressed. 
The majority maintains that contempt has historically been 
considered "sui generis" and is not therefore a "Crime" requiring 
a jury trial within the meaning impliedly given article III by the 
founders; that a 150-year line of decisions should not be overturned 
judicially; that the courts could not maintain discipline and re-
spect without this summary power; and that jury trials in contempt 
cases would require an unwarranted expenditure of time and 
money. The minority responds to each of these arguments. They 
contend that the jury is fully capable of maintaining proper respect 
for court authority and that expense is irrelevant when personal 
liberties are involved. Moreover, they argue that inconclusive de-
bate as to the nature of the eighteenth-century contempt power is 
of no more than scholastic value because of the changed usage of 
the criminal contempt power and that the Court should not hesitate 
to overrule precedent in today's significantly altered factual con-
text. 
The essence of the minority position-its basic premise-is that 
the nature of the criminal contempt proceeding has undergone 
substantial change. Two facets of this change are stressed. First, 
courts are using their discretionary contempt power in an expand-
ing number of situations.16 Second, and of greater concern to the 
13. See note 3 supra. 
14. See Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556 (1961); Levine v. United States, 
362 U.S. 610 (1960); Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959); Green v. United 
States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958); Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957): Nilva v. 
United States, 352 U.S. 385 (1957). In all the above cases at least three Justices 
dissented. 
15. 356 U.S. 165 (1958). 
16. "[The contempt power) has undergone an incredible trani.:~imation and 
growth, slowly at first and then with increasing acceleration, until it has become a 
powerful and pervasive device for enforcement of the criminal law ••.• In brief it 
has become a common device for by-passing the constitutionally prescribed safe-
guards of the regular criminal law in punishing public wrongs. But still worse, its 
subversive potential to that end appears to be virtually unlimited." Id. at 208 (dissent• 
ing opinion of Black, J.). The wide range of federal statutory authorizations for 
the punishment of criminal contempt is listed in an annotation to FED. R. CluM. 
P. 42, in 18 U.S.C.A. 292 n.5 (1961). 
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defendant, criminal contumaciousness is receiving increasingly se-
vere punishment. Rather than the traditional imposition of a small 
fine and two or three days imprisonment,17 sentences now impose 
imprisonment for three or four years,18 and, in some instances, the 
contempt punishment may exceed the penalty imposed in the sub-
stantive proceeding from which the contempt arose. The dis-
senters feel that the "Crimes" to which Article III refers19 should 
be identifiable, at least in part, by the punishment they command,20 
and criminal contempt can, and frequently does, command ex-
treme punishment. Finally, the changed usage is further demon-
strated by the many procedural safeguards which have been made 
applicable to indirect criminal contempt proceedings over the 
years,21 reflecting gradual judicial and legislative recognition that 
criminal contempt is, in fact, "criminal" in nature. 
Despite purported adherence to the traditional view, the major-
ity opinion in the Barnett case nevertheless reveals an uncertainty 
as to the future disposition of jury trial demands in criminal con-
tempt cases. The crucial "dictum" of footnote 12, although only a 
terse, one-sentence statement that is unamplified and undiscussed in 
the body of the opinion, impliedly overrules the precedent line. 
of cases; this dictum, however, does not fill the resultant void. 
Procedurally,22 footnote 12 appears to mean that the court must 
impanel a jury in those cases where it anticipates that more punish-
ment than that "provided for petty offenses" is warr~ted.23 If this is 
17. See principal case at 740-49 (dissenting opinion of Goldberg, J.). 
18. See, e.g., Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556 (1961) (18 months); Reina v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960) (2 years); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 
(1958) (3 years); Collins v. United States, 269 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1959) (3 years); United 
States v. Thompson, 214 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1954) (4 years). 
19. See Mr. Justice Goldberg's dissent in the principal case at 757. 
20. "(T]his Court has refused to foreclose consideration of the severity of the 
penalty as an element to be considered in determining whether a statutory offense, in 
other respects trivial and not a crime at common law, must be deemed so serious 
as to be comparable with common law crimes, and thus entitle the accused to the 
benefit of a jury trial prescribed by the Constitution." District of Columbia v. 
Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 625 (1937). 
21. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b) (providing for notice, a reasonable time for 
preparation of a defense, information as to the facts of the charge, bail, and disqualifi• 
cation of interested judges); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954); Cooke v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925). See also Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610 (1960) (right 
to public trial); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (disqualifying a "one-man grand 
jury" judge from also trying an alleged contempt that occurred before him while 
he was acting a grand jury and providing the right to examine witnesses and to be 
represented by counsel). 
22. Cf. 71 Stat. 638 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1995 (1958) (procedure for contempt 
trials under the 1957 Civil Rights Act); Armstrong v. Bryan, 273 S.W.2d 835 (Ky. 
1954). 
25. "That penalty provided for petty offenses" would" appear to mean a maximum 
of $500 fine and six months imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 1(5) (1958); District of 
Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937). It has been suggested that if local code 
provisions define the allowable penalty for petty offenses even more restrictively 
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true, severity of the sentence in each particular case is the criteria 
used to determine whether a right to jury trial exists. Mr. Justice 
Goldberg, dissenting in Barnett, argues instead that the seriousness 
of the charged offense, measured in part by its maximum permis-
sible sentence, should be the determinant.24 In other words, the 
authors of footnote 12 apparently feel that even serious indirect 
criminal contempts are not "Crimes," for which the Constitution 
provides jury trial, until they are actually punished as "Crimes"; 
Mr. Justice Goldberg, on the other hand, feels that if an indirect 
criminal contempt is itself serious, regardless of how it is actually 
punished, it is a "Crime" and must, upon demand, be tried by a 
jury.25 In practical effect these two approaches differ in two respects. 
First, under footnote 12 a court may, even in a serious offense case, 
impose upon the defendant, without a jury trial, that penalty pro-
vided for petty offenses. This option would not be available under 
Mr. Justice Goldberg's approach.26 Second, footnote 12 does not 
necessarily extend the jury trial guarantee to include direct con-
tempt cases.27 Mr. Justice Goldberg does not specifically deal with 
direct contempt, but some of the phraseology he uses is broad 
than the federal code, the local code may be the relevant standard for determining 
when criminal contempt cases must be tried by a jury. "We do not think the definition 
of petty offense contained in 18 U.S.C. § l .•. applies here ..•. [W]e think we 
may take our guide from the D.C. Code provision governing trial by jury ..•• 
Accordingly, we think it proper to instruct the District Court that if on remand 
it proceeds without a jury, it can impose no greater imprisonment than ninety 
days." Rollerson v. United States, No. 17675, D.C. Cir., Oct. 1, 1964. 
24. Mr. Justice Goldberg suggests that the seriousness of the offense would be 
determined by comparison with like cases and by consideration of the "severity 
of the punishment which could legally have been imposed.'' "If Green's contempt-
jumping bail-was punishable by imprisonment for three years, and if Piemonte's 
contempt-refusal to answer a question before a grand jury-was punishable for 
imprisonment for a year and a half, it would be wholly unrealistic for us to 
assume that •.• the present contempt may be characterized as a petty offense 
...• " Principal case at 758-59. 
25. The essence of this difference in approach between footnote 12 and Mr. 
Justice Goldberg's dissent, if more than illusion, is contained in this thought: "The 
right to trial by jury depends not on the severity of the punishment actually 
imposed, but rather on the severity of the punishment which could legally have 
been imposed." Principal case at 759 n.48. (citing District of Columbia v. Clawans, 
300 U.S. 617, 623 (1937)). Both approaches recognize the validity of correlating 
severity of punishment with the constitutional meaning of the word "crime.'' See 
note 20 supra and accompanying text. The dispute revolves around the nature of 
the correlation. 
26. This analysis, of course, assumes that the courts will generally contemplate 
"serious penalties" only in "serious offense" cases. 
27. See United States v. Harris, 334 F.2d 460, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 85 Sup. 
Ct. 438 (1964) (interpreting the "dictum" of footnote 12 to be inapplicable to con-
tempts committed in the presence of the court). But see Rollerson v. United States, 
No. 17675, D.C. Cir., Oct. 1, 1964 (applying the footnote 12 requirement of jury trial 
where a robbery defendant, asserting an insanity defense, threw a water pitcher at 
the prosecutor in the presence of the court). 
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enough to include these cases.28 Mr. Justice Black, also dissenting 
in Barnett, goes even farther in reiterating a position he has urged 
for several years.29 Although welcoming the "halting but hopeful 
step"80 of footnote 12, he asserts that the right to trial by jury in 
criminal contempt cases, direct or indirect, is guaranteed without 
qualification by both article III and the Bill of Rights.31 
Although the majority rejects both of these dissenting views, 
the Barnett decision in its entirety does indicate that the Court be-
lieves trial by jury in some federal criminal contempt situations is 
constitutionally guaranteed. Therefore, to conclude that this dic-
tum presently will be upheld and will be relied upon by the lower 
courts, to say that it is more than dictum, is not conjecture. Several 
recent Supreme Court decisions, both in contempt cases and in 
analogous areas, evidence a protective concern for the role of the 
jury and the right of the defendant to trial by jury. There is indica-
tion of increasing apprehension toward the sentencing "discre-
tion" in contempt cases. In the Green case, the majority referred to 
the "special responsibility" of appellate courts to see that the power 
is not abused.82 Analogously, in two recent federal civil suits, the 
Court has held that a claimant's right to jury trial on legal issues 
may not be diluted by prior determination of equitable issues.33 
The Court has also held that there is a right to jury trial on the 
legal issues in federal declaratory judgment suits.34 In addition, Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter, who voted with the five-Justice majority in 
Green, has been replaced by Mr. Justice Goldberg, who dissented 
in Barnett. However, Mr. Justice Brennan, a dissenter in Green, 
joined the majority in Barnett and, in a sense, represented the mar-
28. "If a violation of law is punishable by a nontrivial penalty, then the Constitu-
tion does require trial by jury whether the violation is labeled criminal contempt 
or anything else." Principal case at 757. However, the breadth of this statement 
should be appraised in the light of the following statement also made by Mr. 
Justice Goldberg in his dissenting opinion: "Nor am I here concerned with the 
imposition of the trivial punishments traditionally deemed sufficient for maintaining 
order in the courtroom .•.• I am concerned solely with the imposition, without 
trial by jury, of fixed nontrivial punishments after compliance with the court's 
order has been secured." Principal case at 754. (Emphasis added.) 
29. E.g., Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 620 (1960) (dissenting opinion); 
Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 193 (1958) (dissenting opinion); Nilva v. United 
States, 352 U.S. 385, 396 (1957) {dissenting opinion). 
30. Principal case at 727. 
31. "It is high time ..• to wipe out root and branch the judge-invented and 
judge-maintained notion that judges can try criminal contempt cases without a 
jury." Principal case at 727. 
112. 356 U.S. at 188. See Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385 (1957) (remanded 
for resentencing); Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957) (remanded for re-
sentencing); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 13 (1954). 
33. Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 
1159 U.S. 500 (1959). 
34. Simler v. Conner, 872 U.S. 221 (1963). 
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gin of decision. His dissent in the earlier case was on somewhat dif-
ferent grounds, and one may speculate about his future position.85 
The meaning and effect of the Barnett decision await clarifica-
tion. References to the case by lower federal and state courts do 
not reflect a consensus of interpretation. At least one state court has 
referred t:o footnote 12 as if it comprised the holding.36 Another 
state court has mentioned only the certified question and negative 
answer, thus in effect ignoring footnote 12.37 Decisions in the fed-
eral courts have been equally indecisive.38 In two recent cases the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit expressed doubt as to the 
weight and meaning of the so-called "dictum," but did, neverthe-
less, in each case attempt to deal with some uncertainties regarding 
the scope of the right established in footnote 12. In United States v. 
Bialkin,39 without specific acknowledgment to footnote 12 but 
assuming a constitutional right to jury trial, the court held that 
the right had been waived by a guilty plea. United States v. Harrisi0 
35. The right to trial by jury in criminal contempt cases has been in issue, 
directly or by implication, in seven cases since Mr. Justice Brennan joined the 
Court. Cases cited note 14 supra and Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960). 
He has dissented in four and concurred in three. However, in no case is his vote 
clearly based on the jury trial issue, and, of course, his position in Barnett regarding 
foomote 12 is not clear from the opinion. 
36. Pearl v. Upper Lakes Shipping Ltd., 128 N.W.2d 73, 77 n.4 (Wis. 1964). 
37. Holt v. Virginia, 136 S.E.2d 809, 816-17 (Va. 1964). 
38. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently upheld a nonjury 
criminal contempt conviction imposing a $15,000 fine upon the defendant union 
and a $5,000 fine upon its business agent. In re Operating Eng'rs Local 825, 3d 
Cir., June 17, 1964, cert. denied, 85 Sup. Ct. 326 (1964). It appears that the contempt 
consisted of noncompliance with an NLRB order and was therefore of the indirect 
variety. However, the case has not yet been reported, and it is not clear to what 
extent the Barnett decision is in issue. 
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in a direct contempt case involv-
ing a refusal to answer grand jury questions, cited Barnett for the proposition that 
"the trial court here clearly had the power to punish summarily for such criminal 
contempt .•.. " There is no mention of foomote 12. Nitti v. United States, 336 
F.2d 576, 577 (10th Cir. 1964). 
39. 331 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1964) (contempt for violation of an injunction pro• 
hibiting certain activities restricted by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
40. 334 F.2d 460 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 85 Sup. Ct. 438 (1964) (contempt for refusal 
to answer certain grand jury questions upon court direction to do so.) But see 
Castaldi v. United States, 338 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1964), petition for cert. filed, 33 U.S.L. 
WEEK 3223 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1964) (No. 767); Rollerson v. United States, No. 17675, D.C. 
Cir., Oct. 1, 1964. The court held in Rollerson that the defendant, sentenced to one 
year imprisonment for criminal contempt consisting of throwing a water pitcher at 
the prosecutor in the presence of the court, had a right to jury trial under Barnett. 
This is a direct contempt case and therefore is in conflict with Harris; however, in the 
robbery proceeding out of which the contempt arose, the defendant was asserting an 
insanity defense, and it may be that for -this reason the court of appeals felt the de-
fendant was entitled to a jury trial on the question of his responsibility for his actions. 
In direct contempt cases the judge is himself a wimess to the factual events 
which constitute the charged disobedience or misbehavior. The jury's fact-finding 
function is thereby greatly diminished, and the argument against a constitutionally 
guaranteed jury trial is correspondingly strengthened. It has often been urged 
that unless misbehavior in open court is punished immediately, maintenance of 
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held that footnote 12 was not applicable when the disobedience 
occurred in the presence of the court and the contempt proceeding 
was begun before compliance with the order was achieved, presum-
ably restricting the jury guarantee solely to cases of indirect crim-
inal contempt. 
This much is clear from the Barnett decision: if, in a federal in-
direct criminal contempt proceeding, trial by jury is demanded but 
not granted, punishment may not exceed that punishment provided 
for petty offenses. Paradoxically, the footnote 12 dictum is in basic 
accord with, and is necessarily grounded upon, the dissenting argu-
ments. Although these arguments may be persuasive, the strength of 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's reasoning in the Green case41 should be 
recognized, as well as his conclusion that legislation should be enacted 
to accomplish what may be the correct result. However, because 
of the inclusion of footnote 12 in Barnett, the judiciary may resolve 
this problem, at least in the area of indirect criminal contempt 
proceedings, without assistance from the legislature. The trend is 
fairly clear, and the present litigation involving the meaning and 
effect of the Barnett decision suggests that resolution will be neces-
sary in the near future.42 
courtroom decorum will become difficulL Consequently, the distinctions between 
direct and indirect contempt are meaningful; however, at least two counterargu-
ments can be made for not distinguishing between the two and for requiring jury 
trial in each instance. First, the jury performs an insulating function between 
contemnor and judge, which is seemingly more important in direct than in indirect 
contempt situations. Second, punishment for direct contempt -may be equally as 
serious, and equally as "penal" in nature, as that imposed for indirect contempt. 
41. 356 U.S. 189-93. Mr. Justice Frankfurter lists fifty-three United States Supreme 
Court Justices, including Marshall, Holmes, Brandeis, and Cardozo, who have 
sustained the punishment of contempt without jury trial. Id. at 192. "It is not for 
this Court to fashion a wholly novel constitutional doctrine .•• in the teeth of 
an unbroken legislative and judicial history from the foundation of the Nation." 
Id. at 193. Mr. Justice Frankfurter took this position although he had co-authored 
an article, Frankfurter &: Landis, Power To Regulate Contempts, 37 HARV. L. REv. 
1010 (1924), which cast doubt on much of the historical reasoning employed in this 
long history of decisions. In fact, Mr. Justice Black cites that article in his dissent 
in Green. Id. at 196 n.5. 
42. For a recent discussion of Barnett generally, see Goldfarb and Kurzman, Civil 
Rights v. Civil Liberties: The Jury Trial Issue, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 486 (1965). 
